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The Antecedents of Block Share Purchases

ABSTRACT
This study investigates the determinants of block purchases of shares between 1981 and 1989 in
Fortune 500 firms that suiVived the period. We find that poor accounting performance increased
the likelihood of block purchase. consistent with theory suggesting that block purchases are
intended to disciplirie managers. We also find that neither diversification nor defensive measures
such as dual-class stock, shark repellents, and ESOPs had any statistically significant effect on the
likelihood of block purchase. In contrast, firm size and insider ownership were inversely related to
the likelihood of block purchase.

The demise of the hostile takeover market in the late 1980s has heightened interest in
alternative mechanisms of corporate control, particularly in the role played by activist
shareholders. A well-functioning market for corporate control reliant on shareholder activism calls
for large shareholders to target under-performing fmns without being deterred by corporate
defenses. Consistent with the view that large shareholders can effectively play this role, existing
studies show that block share purchases are followed by increases in share value, change in
management and redirection of corporate policies.l However, the determinantS of blockholder
activity remain poorly understood. Specifically, are the firms most in need of redirection targeted
by large shareholders?
This study documents the determinants of block purchases by outside investors by addressing
the following questions. First, do outside blockholders predominantly target poorly performing
firms? Second, are diversified firms more likely to be targeted by outside blockholders than more
focused firms? Mounting evidence indicates that an important goal of restructuring in the 1980s
was to reverse inefficient diversification among large fmns.2 Blockholders may have played an
important role in catalyzing corporate refocusing. Finally, are block purchses deterred by
defensive mechanisms such as dual-class stock structures, ESOPs, shark repellents, and
incorporation in a state with anti-takeover statutes? Defensive mechanisms may dilute incentives
to buy large blocks of stock by reducing outside shareholder voting power. Defenses should have
little effect on the incidence of blockholder activity in a well-functioning market for corporate
control.
Our main fmdings, based on an analysis of the determinants of block purchases in a sample
of 264 F onune 500 fmns that survived the 1980s, are fourfold:
(i)

Block share purchases by outsiders are most likely to occur when target fmns have low
accounting performance. This supports previous theory and evidence that blockholders
discipline managers of under-performing firms.

(ii)

A company's diversification policy does not affect the likelihood of a large block purchase by
outside investors. This suggests that diversified firms do not provide more attractive
arbitrage opportunities for buyers of blocks of stock than do more focused firms.

(iii) Incorporation in a state with anti-takeover laws and adoption of defensive measures such as

dual-class stock structures, shark repellents, and ESOPs do not reduce the likelihood of an
investor purchasing a block of stock in a firm. This corroborates previous evidence that
defensive mechanisms have little effect on the likelihood of takeover.
(iv) Block purchases are less likely to occur in firms with high insider ownership and in large

firms. These fmdings are consistent with previous evidence that firms with these
characteristics experience fewer takeovers.
Overall, these fmdings show that block purchases are often motivated by poor target finn
performance and that defensive mechanisms are ineffective in deterring large block share
purchases. This suggests that the market for corporate control functions effectively to remedy the
agency costs of separation of ownership and control in large corporations.
This remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I discusses the relationship
between block purchases, defensive mechanisms, and the market for corporate control. Section ll
describes the sample selection procedure and data used in the study. The empirical evidence on
the antecedents of block purchases is presented in Section m. Section IV summarizes our fmdings
and concludes.

I. Blockholders and the Market for Partial Corporate Control
A. Block Purchases, Managerial Discipline, and Target Firm Performance

It is widely recognized that the interests of managers of publicly held corporations may
diverge from those of stockholders. However, the degree to which managers can pursue their own
interests at shareholders' expense may be moderated by the market for corporate control.
Specifically, managers who do not act in shareholder interests can be replaced through takeover
(Manne ( 1965) ), or disciplined by large shareholders (i.e., blockholders ). Blockholders have
incentives to monitor and control managers because they internalize the benefits of these actions
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through their purchases (Demsetz and Lehn (1985)). Blockholders can use their voting power to
promote efficient corporate policies; if managers resist changing corporate policy, blockholders
can threaten to put the finn into play (Shleifer and Vishny (1986)). Empirical evidence shows that
blockholders increase finn value by disciplining managers and effecting changes in corporate
policy. Holderness and Sheehan (1985), for example, find that block purchases increase share
value and precede changes in top management. Mikkelson and Ruback (1991) show that
increases in share value following block purchases are subsequently dissipated if top management
is not replaced, or if major changes in corporate policy do not take place. It is not known,
however, whether blockholders systematically target poorly performing firms.

B. Diversification and Block Purchases
Diversification has been widely acknowledged as a source of poor finn performance during
the ·1980s. Empirical evidence provided by Lang and Stulz (1992) shows that focused firms had
consistently higher Tobin's q's than did more diversified fmns during the 1980s. Likewise,
Comment and Jarrell (1993) show that refocusing during the 1980s increased fmn value.
There are two principle explanations for the poor performance of diversified fmns. First,
diversification may result from inefficient expansion undertaken by managers seeking to
maximize their private benefits rather than the value of the finn (Marris ( 1964 ), Jensen ( 1988) ).
In particular, Amihud and Lev (1981) and Morek, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) argue that
managers who are not large shareholders have incentives to diversify into unrelated lines of
business to reduce bankruptcy risk and hence, protect the value of their human capital. Second,
diversified firms may have become less efficient over time compared to more focused firms.
These reason for this is that internal capital markets, on which diversified fmns have historically
relied, have become less efficient relative to external capital markets. Increased liquidity and a
lower cost of raising funds externally may have caused more focused fmns to perform better than
diversified firms (Bhide ( 1990)).
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H diversification reduces finn value, then shareholders can be expected to buy blocks of stock
and refocus operations. This study investigates whether diversified fmns

are more likely than

focused fmns to become targets of block purchases. Diversified firms may also be more attractive
restructuring opportunities than focused firms because correcting overdiversiflcation may be
easier than improving performance in unprofitable, but focused firms. In the former case,
shareholders purchase stock and divest under-performing lines of business. In the latter case,
however, restructuring typically entails complex strategies that call for detailed knowledge of
operations on the part of blockholders.

C. Defensive Mechanisms and Block Purchases
Faced with hostile activist investors, self-interested managers may seek to protect their jobs
and associated private consumption streams by adopting "defensive" mechanisms -- such as dualclass stock structures, shark repellents, and ESOPs -- that significantly increase the cost of
takeovers and partial changes in corporate control. Managers may also re-incorporate a finn in a
state with anti-takeover statutes. These mechanisms dilute incentives in the market for partial
corporate control because they increase takeover costs. One way that blockholders exert their
influence is to threaten to put a firm into play if managers are unwilling to improve corporate
policy (DeAngelo and Rice (1983), Shleifer and Vishny (1986)). In addition, defensive
mechanisms such as dual-class stock structures and super-majority provisions diminish
blockholders' voting power, preventing them from using proxy contests and otherwise exercising
their voting power to pressure managers to change corporate policy.

C.J Dual-Class Stock Structures
In dual-class stock structures, only a minority of shares are accorded full voting rights;
shareholders at large have less than full voting power to effect change in corporate policy. 3
Consequently, if voting stock is concentrated in the hands of managers and other insiders, they can
use their voting power to protect their private consumption streams against shareholder activism
and takeover (Ruback ( 1988)). Consistent with the argument that dual-class stock structures raise
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the costs of disciplining managers, Jarrell and Poulsen (1988) fmd that announcements of dualclass recapitalizations, especially for fmns with high insider stock ownership, are accompanied by
statistically significant negative price effects.4

C.2 Shark Repellents
Shark repellents include super-majority provisions, classified board provisions, fair price and
redemption rights provisions, poison pills, and preferred stock authorizations. These provisions
increase the costs of influencing fmn policy because they force blockholders to incur the cost of
legal challenges to restrictions on block ownership or force blockholders to incur the cost of
gaining management's approval to block purchases. Consistent with the argument that shark
repellents are detrimental to shareholders' interests, Jarrell and Poulsen ( 1987) fmd negative stock
price reactions to announcements of anti-takeover charter amendments. s Ryngaert ( 1988) and
Malatesta and Walkling (1988) fmd negative stock price reactions to poison pill announcements. 6
Despite this evidence, the effectiveness of shark repellents in actually deterring takeovers is
unclear. Ambrose and Megginson (1992) fmd that anti-takeover charter amendments and poison
pills do not reduce the likelihood of takeover, although preferred stock authorizations appear to
reduce takeover frequency. Comment and Schwert (1993) also fmd that poison pills have no
effect on the likelihood of takeover.7

C.3 Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs)
During the 1980s, many fmns adopted ESOPs, most of which diluted the voting power of
outsider investors by transferring the control of blocks of shares from outsiders to trustees elected
by insiders. Although ESOPs may also serve other purposes, such as providing performance
incentives to employees and tax benefits to firms, critics of ESOPs contend that they entrench
incumbent management and are detrimental to shareholder interests. Consistent with this
argument, Gordon and Pound ( 1990) find that ESOPs established in the presence of takeover
activity and those that transferred control from outside shareholders reduced firm value. 8
Similarly, Chang and Mayers (1993) find that ESOPs established by fmns in which managers
held a high proportion of shares reduced fmn value.
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C.4 Second-Generation State Anti-Takeover Statutes
Second-generation state anti-takeover statutes restrict the voting rights of large shareholders
or delay mergers for periods of three to five years for companies in their jurisdiction.9 Critics of

state anti-takeover statutes argue that they diminish the voting rights of large outside shareholders
and diminish blockholders' ability to make credible takeover threats to management. Supporting
the argument that anti-takeover statutes reduce shareholders' power to discipline managers,
Karpoff and Malatesta ( 1989) and Szewczyk and Tsetsekos ( 1992) fmd negative average returns
in firms affected by state anti-takeover statutes.IO

D. Other Dete"ents to Block Purchases
D.l Insider Ownership
Insider share ownership can provide incentives for managers and other corporate decisionmakers to act in the interests of shareholders at large (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). However,
Stulz (1988) cautions that insider ownership can also increase insiders' discretion for selfinterested behavior, because managers who own a large proportion of shares can use their voting
power to resist takeovers and shareholder activism. Consistent with this argument, Morek,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) fmd that the relationship between
insider share ownership and Tobin's q is non-monotonic, showing first an increase, consistent with
incentive effects, and then a decline, consistent with entrenchment. Dann and DeAngelo ( 1988)
and Denis ( 1990) fmd that changes in corporate fmancial structure that increase insiders' voting
power reduce finn value. These fmdings are consistent with the argument that insiders use their
voting power to protect their private interests.

D.2 Firm Size
Target finn size is another factor that may deter block purchases by activist investors.
Purchasers of blocks of shares may be limited by individual or corporate wealth constraints, and
so, may be less able to buy blocks of stock in large firms (Demsetz and Lehn (1985)). Consistent
with this theory, Ambrose and Megginson (1992) fmd that large firms are less likely to receive
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takeover bids than smaller firms; Similarly, Comment and Schwert (1993) fmd that large firms
are less likely to be taken over.

II. Sample Selection and Data
A. Sample
We test our hypotheses with an exhaustive sample of 264 Fonune 500 firms in 1981 that
remained publicly traded through 1989. We excluded firms that merged or were acquired
between 1981 and 1989, as well as foreign firms, subsidiary companies, and firms that declared
bankruptcy. This sainple allows us to examine changes in corporate control in the largest
surviving publicly held fmns in the U.S. economy. By examining surviving firms we attempt to
distinguish between "toehold" block purchases made prior to takeover and disciplinary block
purchases in which blockholders seek to discipline managers without resorting to takeover
(Shleifer and Vishny ( 1986)). The sample contains a survivorship bias, because it includes only
firms that remained on the market through 1989. This bias, however, lessens our chances of
finding a relationship between poor performance and block purchases, given that many poorly
performing fmns were taken over during the 1980s and thus, are excluded from our sample.
Likewise, a survivorship bias favors us fmding that defensive mechanisms deter block purchases,
because ceteris paribus, fmns that survived the 1980s without being acquired are likely to have
had more effective defensive mechanisms than fmns that did not survive.

B. Definition of Shareholder Groups
We follow McConnell and Servaes (1990) in defming two primary groups of shareholders:
blockholders and insider owners. McConnell and Servaes's ( 1990) classification of shareholder
groups follows the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filing procedures, which define a
blockholder as any corporation or individual who owns a beneficial interest of 5 percent or more
of a fmn's outstanding shares. Insiders are defmed as officers and directors of a fmn and their
families.
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In Section I, we argued that owners of large blocks of stock are likely to increase finn value.
However,not all blockholders as defined by the SEC can be expected to exert a disciplinary effect
on managers. In particular, some existing blockholders such as founders, founding families, and
family trusts can be expected to reflect insider interests. Family trusts, for example, have
incentives to ensure continued employment in the firm for family members and adequate
dividends to support beneficiaries' private consumption.ll Therefore, when measuring insider
ownership, we classify the ownership interests of insider blockholders with those of other insider
owners as defined by the SEC.

C. Data Sources
Data on insider and outsider ownership structure were collected from Value Line and
confirmed using the Wall Street Journal and 13D filings. Data on diversification were collected
from TRINET Inc.'s Large Establishment Database, which was released in 1981, 1983, 1985,
1987, and 1989. Data on the presence of anti-takeover charter amendments, dual-class share
structures, states of incorporation, and ESOPs were collected from Moody's Industrial Manual.
We used information supplied by Karpoff and Malatesta (1989) to identify states that adopted
second-generation anti-takeover laws. Financial information was obtained from COMPUSTAT.

D. Methods
We tested the hypotheses using pooled time-series cross-sectional logistic regressions. Data
for each firm were collected for five two-year time periods consonant with the availability of
TRINET data on diversification. These periods are 1980-81, 1982-83, 1984-85, 1986-87, and
1988-89. Details of the logit analyses of the determinants of block purchases are discussed in the
following section.
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III. Empirical Results
A. Sample Characteristics
Table I describes the fmns in the sample during the 1980-89 period. The frequency of block
purchases is measured using a dummy variable that equals one if an outsider bought at least 5
percent of a finn's outstanding common stock during a two-year period (and zero otherwise).
Block purchases took place in approximately 6 percent of the fmns in the sample in the 1982-83
and 1984-85 periods, and in 5.3 percent offmns in the 1986-87 period. In the 1988-89 period,
block purchases took place in 10.2 percent of sample fmns.
Table I also shows the average profit margin and return on assets (ROA) measured at the
outset of each two-year period and the dividend-adjusted stock return for the two-year period.t2
Both profit margin and ROA declined slightly in the early 1980s and then increased. Stock returns
fluctuated more, with an average 19 percent drop in 1985-87 and a gain of 57.4 percent between
1988 and 1989. These changes reflect the collapse of stock prices in 1987 and their subsequent
recovery.
Diversification is measured using a Herfindahl concentration ratio of employees for all fourdigit lines of business of a fmn for the years 1981. 1983, 1985, 1987, and 1989. This ratio
(reported as a percentage) is lower for more diversified fmns and higher for more focused fmns.
Table I shows that sample firms became slightly more diversified between 1981 and 1989, with
the Herfmdahl ratio falling from 28 percent in 1981 to 26.3 percent in 1989.
The dual-class dummy variable equals one if a finn had a dual-clac;s stock structure at the
outset of any two-year period (zero otherwise). In 1981,4.5 percent of sample fmns had dualclass stock. This percentage rose throughout most of the period analyzed; by 1989, 7.6 percent of
sample firms had dual-class stock. The shark repellent dummy equals one if a fmn had a
shareholders' rights plan (zero otherwise). In our sample, 31.4 percent offmns had some type of
shark repellent in 1981; by 1989, all firms had some type of shark repellent in their charter. The
ESOP dummy equals one if a fmn had an ESOP in place (zero otherwise). The data show an
increase in ESOP adoption. In 1981, 3.4 percent of sample fmns had an ESOP; by 1989, 9.5
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percent of ftrms had adopted an ESOP. The state anti-takeover law dummy equals one if a frrm is
incorporated in a state with an anti-takeover law (zero otherwise). By 1989 most states had
passed some type of anti-takeover legislation and nearly all frrms in the sample were incorporated
in one of these states. Only nine finns in the sample changed states of incorporation during the
period. Of those nine firms, six changed from .a state with no amendment to a state with antitakeover legislation.
Average insider ownership, which includes the holdings of officers and directors, their
family members, founders, founding families, and founding family trusts, declined slightly over
-the period. In 1981 insiders held an average of 9.1 percent of outstanding shares, whereas in 1989
they held 6.9 percent. We define an insider holding dummy that equals one if insiders held 5
percent or more of a finn's outstanding shares in any period (zero otherwise).l3 This dummy
measures insider holdings large enough to motivate managers to maximize share value. The mean
value of this dummy variable declined from about 4.6 percent in 1980-81 to about 4.1 percent in
1988-89. A dummy was also defmed for large ftrms that equals one if a frrm's sales were above
the sample median, measured for all periods (zero otherwise). The data show that frrms in the
sample increased in size between 1981 and 1989; by 1989,58.3 percent of the frrms in the sample
had constant dollar sales above the sample median.

B. Univariate Comparisons
Table ll compares the characteristics of ftrms that experienced block purchac;es during
1981-89 with frrms that did not. The table shows the medians of descriptive variables and the
corresponding p-values from Wilcoxon tests of differences in distribution.
First, Table ll shows statistically significant differences in median profitability, measured at
the outset of each two-year period, between frrms in which block purchases took place and other
firms. Firms in which block purchases took place had a median profit margin of3.4 percent,
compared with a median profit margin of 5 percent in ftrms in which no block purchases took
place. This represents an absolute difference in performance of 1.6 percent between the two
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groups of firms; the performance of firms that did not experience block purchases was 147
percent greater than the performance of firms that did. Similar results are found for ROA and
stock return. The median ROA in firms experiencing block purchases was 4.4 percent, compared
with a median ROA of 6.5 percent in firms with no block purchases -- an absolute difference in
performance of 2.1 percent and a percentage difference of 148 percent. The median two-year
dividend-adjusted stock returns were lower in firms experiencing block purchases; in these firms,
median returns were 2.2 percent, compared with 4.9 percent in other fmns. These fmdings are
consistent with the hypothesis that outsider investors purchase blocks of stock with the intention
of disciplining managers to improve finn performance.
There is no statistically significant difference in the median Herfmdahl ratio of corporate
focus between the two groups of fmns. This suggests that blockholders of stock were indifferent
to firms' diversification policies at the time that they invested. It also indicates that diversification
policy was not an underlying cause of the differences in fmn performance observed between fmns
experiencing block purchases and other fums.
With regard to defensive mechanisms, we find no statistically significant difference in the
mean proportion of fmns with dual-class stock structures between the two groups of fmns.
However, firms that experienced block purchases had a statistically significant higher mean
incidence of shark repellents and ESOP adoptions and were more likely to be incorporated in a
state with an anti-takeover amendment than were fmns that did not experience a block purchase.
Coupled with accounting performance that is lower in fmns that experienced block purchases, this
finding is consistent with the argument that managers of under-performing firms institute
defensive mechanisms, as found by Comment and Schwert ( 1993 ).
Finally, median insider ownership, measured as a percentage of insider holdings to
outstanding shares, does not differ between the groups. The mean insider ownership dummy for

finns that experienced a block purchase, however, was significantly lower than that for other
finns. Firms in which block purchases took place were also smaller, an indication that large firm
size may deter such purchases.
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C. Determinants of Block Purchases
Table m shows the results of the logit regressions predicting block purchases using measures
of corporate performance, diversification, defensive measures, insider holdings, and firm size.1 4
The most important result is that block purchases are more likely to take place in firms with poor
accounting performance, which is consistent with the findings of the univariate analyses presented
in Table n. Model 1 shows that fmns with lower profit margins at the outset of any two-year
period were about six times more likely to experience a block purchase during that period than
other fmns (coeffic~ent

=-8.52, p-value < 5 percent).IS Model 2 is a lagged model that examines

the effects of profits at the outset of the previous two-year period and changes in profits during the
previous two-year period on the likelihood of a block purchase. The results of this regression also
show that firms with low prior profitability and subsequent declines in profitability were more
likely to experience block purchases.
Similar results are shown in Models 3 and 4, which measure profitability in terms of ROA.
Model 3 shows that firms with low ROA at the outset of a two-year period were about three times
more likely to be the target of a block purchase than other firms (coefficient= -4.42, p-value < 1
percent). Similarly, Model 4 shows that ROA at the outset of the prior two-year period, and
change in ROA in the prior period, are also statistically significant and strongly negatively related
to block purchases.
Overall, this evidence consistently shows that outside blockholders buy into firms with poor
accounting performance. These results are obtained despite the presence of a survivorship bias
that should overstate the average profitability of surviving fmns during the 1980s. Moreover,
because we analyze only surviving fmns, the evidence indicates that blockholders frequently buy
into under-performing fmns without subsequently pursuing a takeover. This result is consistent
with previous theory and evidence that blockholders play an important role in disciplining
managers in under-performing fmns (Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Holderness and Sheehan
(1985), Mikkelson and Ruback (1991)).
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ModelS shows no statistically significant relationship between firms' two-year dividendadjusted stock returns and the likelihood of block purchase. This fmding is inconsistent with the
evidence presented in Table II, that stock returns were significantly lower in fmns experiencing
block purchases.
None of the regression models indicate that diversification influences the likelihood of block
purchase. This finding is consistent with the univariate analyses, which show that there is little
difference in corporate focus between firms experiencing block purchases and other firms.
Together, these results strongly support the conclusion that diversification policy did not motivate
block purchases during the 1980s. This evidence appears to contradict the conclusions of several
prior studies that diversification reduces finn value. For example, Comment and Jarrell (1993)
find that refocusing increases fmn value, whereas Lang and Stulz (1992) find a substantial
discount in the market value of diversified fmns during the 1980s. The results of the univariate
analysis show that our fmdings are not due to a correlation between diversification and poor
performance.
The regressions also provide no evidence that defensive mechanisms deter block purchases.
None of the variables measuring dual-class stock, shark repellents, ESOPs or state anti-takeover
laws are statistically significant in any of the regressions. Again, this result is obtained despite a
survivorship bias that favors the survival of fmns with effective defensive mechanisms. Our
findings are inconsistent with the results of the univariate analyses presented in Table II, which
indicate a strong correlation between block purchases and the adoption of defensive measures.
They are consistent, however, with Comment and Schwert's (1993) fmdings that defensive
measures are predicted by poor firm perfonnance. One explanation is that the correlation shown
in Table II loses its significance once we control for peifonnance.

All five models show that insider ownership and large firm size deter block purchases. The
coefficient of the insider dummy is about -0.50 in all five regressions, indicating that blockholders
are two-thirds as likely to buy into firms with high insider share ownership. This evidence
suggests that entrenched insiders may deter changes in partial corporate control, as well as
13

complete changes in corporate control, as suggested by Dann and DeAngelo (1988), Stulz (1988),
and Denis (1990). The coefficient on the large firm dummy is about -0.70 in all five regressions,
indicating that blockholders buy into large firms at less than half the rate that they do in other

finns. Finn size appears to protect managers from the market for corporate control. This fmding is
consistent with Ambrose and Megginson (1992) and Comment and Schwert ( 1993 ), which show
that takeovers are less frequent in large firms.

IV. Summary and Conclusion
This study presents evidence that outside blockholders play an important role in disciplining
managers of public fmns. We fmd that block purchases are more likely to take place in fmns with
poor accounting performance and that defensive mea<;ures are ineffective in deterring block
purchases. These fmdings have important implications for corporate governance in the 1990s. In
recent years, the market for hostile takeovers and buyouts has largely subsided, leaving the task of
monitoring and controlling managers in many large public firms to activist shareholders.
Therefore, factors that deter block purchases threaten this new environment of corporate control.

Our fmdings provide some reassurance on this count. They suggest that blockholders serve the
interests of shareholders by targeting under-performing fmns, and that managers in such fmns
cannot prevent block purchases and their disciplinary consequences by adopting defensive
mechanisms.
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Endnotes
1 See, for example, Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Mikkelson and Ruback ( 1991 ), Holderness and

Sheehan (1985), and Barclay and Holderness (1991 ).
2 See Bhagat, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990), Comment and Jarrell (1993), and Lang and Stulz

(1992).
3 The voting rights of so-called nonvoting shares in dual-class stock structures vary. Usually,
nonvoting shares have some voting rights, but they are considerably restricted relative to the rights
ofvoting shares.
4 Jarrell and Poulsen (1988) find an average one-day announcement return of -0.82 percent for a

sample of 88 dual class recapitalizations between 1976 and 1987. In contrast, Partch ( 1987) finds
no significant stock price effects when dual-class stock structures are announced.
5 Jarrell and Poulsen (1987) fmd an average announcement return of -1.25 percent for a sample of

649 anti-takeover charter amendments during the period 1980-85.
6 Ryngaert (1988) finds an average return of -0.34 percent for a sample of 283 poison pill

announcements; Malatesta and Walkling (1988) fmd an average announcement return of -0.92
percent for a sample of 132 poison pills.
7 Comment and Schwert ( 1993) argue that poison pills are instituted by managers in anticipation

of a takeover attempt. They fmd that the same factors that predict takeovers also predict the
adoption of poison pills, and that poison pills are associated with increac;;es in takeover premiums.
8 In a sample of 94 ESOPs formed between 1987 and 1989, Gordon and Pound (1990) fmd a
two~ay

negative share price reaction of approximately -4 percent to ESOPs formed in the

presence of takeover activity and a negative ~hare price reaction of -4.6 percent to ESOPs that
diluted the voting power of outside shareholders.
9 Second-generation state anti-takeover Jaws were enacted after the U.S. Supreme Court

overturned "first-generation" anti-takeover legislation. Second-generation control share statutes in
Indiana were upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1987; an appellate court upheld Wisconsin's

18

business combination statute in 1988. These laws usually include one or more of the following
provisions: (i) control share provisions, which require that a target firm's shareholders preapprove
acquisitions of voting rights above a certain level of ownership; (ii) fair price provisions, which
regulate the back-end price in a two-tiered takeover bid involving large shareholders; and (iii)
freeze-out laws, which prohibit a bidder from engaging in a business combination with a target
firm for a specified period, unless so approved by the target firm's board (Karpoff and Malatesta
(1989)).
10 Karpoff and Malatesta (1989) document an average two-day return of -0.29 percent for firms

affected by the passage of state anti-takeover statutes. Szewczyk and Tsetsekos (1992) fmd
average abnormal returns of -9.09 percent for fmns affected by Pennsylvania's anti-takeover
statute during the period that the statute was being legislated.
11 Chandler ( 1990), among others, argues that founders and founding families may be more

concerned with maintaining control of a business and its associated private income streams than
with maximizing the value of the fmn. Consistent with the conjecture that some blockholders
represent the interests of insiders rather than shareholders at large, Slovin and Sushka ( 1993) fmd
a two-day abnormal stock price reaction of 3.01 percent when the deaths of insider blockholders
are announced.
12 Profit margin is measured as the ratio of operating income before depreciation to sales. ROA is

measured as the ratio of operating income before depreciation to assets.
13 In unreported analyses, we defined dummies for insider ownership ranging from 5 percent to

50 percent to distinguish between levels of insider ownership that might motivate managers and
those that might entrench managers, consistent with the fmdings of Morek, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990). We did not fmd any differences in our results using
different definitions of insider ownership.
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14 In unreported analyses, we spit our sample into two time periods: 1981-1985 and 1986-1989.

We ran logit regressions identical to those described on the two samples. We did not fmd any
significant differences in results between the two samples.
15 Maddala ( 1983) shows that an equivalent ordinary least squares regression coefficient is

approximately two-thirds the magnitude of a logit coefficient.
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Table I

Descriptive Statistics by Two-Year Period
Sample means of measures of blockholder purchases, performance, diversification, and defensive measures. The
sample consists of 264 Fortune 500 finns in 1981 that survived as independent public firms through 1989. Block
purchase frequency equals one if a shareholder bought at least 5 percent of a firm's outstanding common stock
during the two-year period indicated (zero otherwise). Profit margin equals operating income/sales before
depreciation. ROA equals operating income/assets before depreciation. Stock return is the dividend-adjusted twoyear stock return for each period indicated. The Herfindahl ratio is a measure of the focus of a firm's activities across
business areas; it is the sum of the squared JI"Oponions of each four-digit line of business's share of total fum
employees. The dual-class dummy equals one if a fum had dual-class stock at the outset of the two-year period
indicated (zero otherwise). The shark repellent dummy equals one if a fum had an anti-takeover charter amendment,
poison pill, or other type of shark repellent in place at the outset of the two-year period indicated (zero otherwise).
The ESOP dummy equals one if a fum had an ESOP at the outset of the two-year period indicated (zero otherwise).
The state anti-takeover statute dummy equals one if a fum was incorporated in a state with a second-generation
takeover amendment at the outset of the two-year period indicated (zero otherwise). The insider percent is the
fraction of shares held by a flllll's officers, directors, founders, founding family members, or founding family trusts at
the outset of the two-year period indicated. The insider holding dummy equals one if a firm's officers, directors,
founders, founding family members, or founding family trusts held 5 percent or more of a firm's stock at the outset of
the two-year period indicated (zero otherwise). The large fum dummy variable equals one if a firm's sales were
larger than the pooled sample median fum sales for all five periods (zero otherwise).

1980~81

1982-83

1984-85

1986-87

0%

6.1%

6.1%

5.3%

10.2%

Profit margin

0.055

0.041

0.032

0.050

0.048

Return on assets (ROA)

0.071

Stock return
Herfmdahl ratio of focus
Dual-class dummy

-0.068
28.0%
4.5%

0.053
0.252
27.2%
5.3%

0.042
0.047
27.4%
6.1%

0.055
-0.190
26.3%
8.0%

0.053
0.574
26.3%
7.6%

Shark repellent dummy

31.4%

31.4%

34.5%

76.9%

100%

ESOP dummy

3.4%

3.4%

4.2%

4.9%

9.5%

State anti-takeover
statute dummy

0.0%

12.1%

29.9%

40.9%

94.3%

Insider ownership percent

9.1%

8.3%

7.7%

7.1%

6.9%

Insider dummy

48.9%

50.0%

46.2%

42.8%

41.3%

Large firm dummy

46.2%

47.3%

48.9%

54.9%

58.3%

Sample Means
Block purchase frequency
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1988-89

Table II
Comparison of Firms Experiencing Block Purchases to Other Firms
Comparison of the median values of variables (mean values for dummy variables) for firms that did and did not
experience block purchases between 1981 and 1989, and the corresponding Wilcoxon test statistics for differences in
diSbibution. Block purchase frequency equals one if a shareholder bought at least 5 percent of a firm's outstanding
common stock during the two-year period indicated (zero otherwise). Profit margin equals operating income/sales
before depreciation. ROA equals operating income/assets before depreciation. Stock return is the dividend-adjusted
two-year stock return for each period indicated. The Herfindahl ratio is a measure of the focus of a firm's activities
across business areas; it is the sum of the squared proportions of each four-digit line of business's share of total firm
employees. The dual-class dummy equals one if a fiTill had dual-class stock at the outset of the two-year period
indicated (zero otherwise). The shark repellent dummy equals one if a fiTill had an anti-takeover charter amendment,
poison pill, or other type of shark repellent in place at the outset of the two-year period indicated (zero otherwise).
The ESOP dummy equals one if a fiTill had an ESOP at the outset of the two-year period indicated (zero otherwise).
The state anti-takeover statute dummy equals one if a fiTill was incorporated in a state with a second-generation
takeover amendment ai the outset of the two-year period indicated (zero otherwise). The insider percent is the
fraction of shares held by a firm's officers, directors, founders, founding family members, or founding family trusts at
the outset of the two-year period indicated. The insider holding dummy equals one if a firm's officers, directors,
founders, founding family members, or founding family trusts held 5 percent or more of a firm's stock at the outset of
the two-year period indicated (zero otherwise). The large fiTill dummy variable equals one if a firm's sales · were
larger than the pooled sample median fiTill sales for all five periods (zero otherwise).

No Block
Purchase
statistic

Wilcoxon
test
(p-value)

Variable

Block
Purchase

Profit margin
Return onassets (ROA)

0.034
0.044

0.050
0.065

0.0001
0.0001

Stock return

0.022

0.049

0.0400

Herfmdahl ratio of focus

0.247

0.218

0.2900

Dual-class dummy
Shark repellent dummy

0.041

0.4308

0.685

0.064
0.541

ESOP dummy

0.096

0.040

0.0200

State anti-takeover statute dummy

0.562

0.342

0.0001

Insider ownership percent

0.020

0.020

0.9089

Insider dummy
Large fmn dummy

0.301
0.343

0.468
0.503

0.0056
0.0075
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0.0161

Table III
Logit Analysis of Blockholder Entry into Fortune 500
Firms that Remained Independent Between 1981 and 1989
The dependent variable equals one if a shareholder bought at least 5 percent of the ftnn's outstanding common stock
in any two-year period sampled (zero otherwise). Block purchase frequency equals one if a shareholder bought at
least 5 percent of a ftnn's outstanding common stock during the two-year period indicated (zero otherwise). Profit
margin equals operating income/sales before depreciation. ROA equals operating income/assets before depreciation.
StOck return is the dividend-adjusted two-year stock return for each period indicated. The Herfindahl ratio is a
measure of the focus of a fiTill's activities across business areas; it is the sum of the squared proportions of each fourdigit line of business's share of total firm employees. The dual-class dummy equals one if a fum had dual-class stock
at the outset of the two-year period indicated (zero otherwise). The shark repelJent dummy equals one if a fum had
an anti-takeover chaner amendment, poison pill, or other type of shark repelJent in place at the outset of the two-year
period indicated (zero otherwise). The ESOP dummy equals one if a fum had an ESOP at the outset of the two-year
period indicated (zero otherwise). The state anti-takeover statute dummy equals one if a fum was incorporated in a
state with a second-generation takeover amendment at the outset of the two-year period indicated (zero otherwise).
The insider percent is the fraction of shares held by a firm's officers, directors, founders, founding family members,
or founding family ousts at the outset of the two-year period indicated. The insider holding dummy equals one if a
fum's officers, directors, founders, founding family members, or founding family trusts held 5 percent or more of a
fum's stock at the outset of the two-year period indicated (zero otherwise). The large firm dummy variable equals one
if a fiTill's sales were larger than the pooled sample median firm sales for all five period~ (zero otherwise).
Results are displayed on the following page.
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Modell

Model2

Model3

Model4

ModelS

Intercept

3.69
(2.34)

2.10
(1.18)

-2.11
(44.6)•••

2.05
(40.7)•••

-2.31
(56.6)•••

Profit margin at the
begirming of the
b1ockholder entry period

-8.52
(5.96)••

Profit margin 2 years prior
to blockholder entry period

-6.21
(5.32)••

Olange in p-ofit margin in the
2 years Jrior to blockholder entry

-2.16
(6.70)**
-4.42
(7.67)•••

ROA at the beginning of the
blockholder entry period

-5.54

ROA 2 years prior to the
blockholder entry period

(9.04)•••

Change in ROA during the 2 year
period prior to blockholder entry

-3.83
(5.55)**
-0.21
(1.35)

Stock market return for 2 years
prior to blockholder entry
Hetfmdahl ratio of focus

0.49
(0.54)

0.38
(0.32)

0.40
(0.35)

0.39
(0.35)

0.40
(0.36)

Dual-class dummy

-0.46
(0.53)

-0.48
(0.57)

-0.45
(0.52)

-0.42
(0.46)

-0.57
(0.82)

Shark repellent dummy

0.28
(1.19)

0.27
(1.11)

0.29
(1.34)

0.26
(1.06)

0.27
(1.17)

0.19

0.21

0.16

0 .13

0.26

(0.08)

(0.11)

(0.06)

(0.04)

(0.18)

State anti-takeover statute dummy

0.13
(0.20)

0.13
(0.19)

0.10
(0.12)

0.092
(0.09)

0.11
(0.14)

Insider dummy

-0.51
(3.67)*

-0.50
(354)*

-0.51
(3.77)*

-0.48
(3.26)*

(4.33)••

-0.70
(6.65)•••

-0.72
(7.11)•••

-0.73
(7.37)•••

-0.72
(7.06)•••

-0.80
(8.84)•••

ESOP dummy

Large frrm dummy
Log-likelihood
Model p-value

-252.6
0.001

-255.3
0.016

-254.1
0.004

-253.5
0.005

( ) indicates chi-square test of whether a coefficient is different from zero. The asterisks indicate:
• statistically significant at the 10% confidence level.
•• statistically significant at the 5% confidence level.
••• statistically significant at the 1% confidence level.
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-0.54

-257.6
0.052
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